

# Limited Feedback Spectrum Sharing for Cognitive MIMO Radio

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# Outline

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- Background and Motivation
- Cognitive MIMO Radio
- Spectrum Sharing Model
- Game-theoretic Formulation
- Summary and Trends



# Outline


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
# Background and Motivation

- High data rate communication is demanded




# Background and Motivation

- Spectrum Scarcity
  - Most of the frequency spectrum resource has been allocated. [U.S. FA Chart]



# Background and Motivation

- Spectrum Inefficient Utilization
  - Spectrum utilization depends strongly on time and place. [NSF-0335272]




Frequency (Hz)



# Background and Motivation


- Optimal transmission strategy is usually difficult to be obtained and impractical



# Background and Motivation

- Convergence of the heterogeneous networks

## Multiple type networks coexist





# Background and Motivation

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- Improve the spectrum efficiency
- Dynamic spectrum sharing
- Limited feedback communication
- Distributed optimization

Distributed Limited feedback cognitive radio networks



# Outline

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
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# Cognitive MIMO Radio

- MIMO
  - Advantage:
    1. Provide dramatic capacity gain
    2. Increase spectrum efficiency
  - Disadvantage:


Costly in terms of size, power and hardware. Complex in signal processing.



$$\mathbf{H}^{(t)} = \begin{bmatrix} h_{11}^{(t)} & h_{12}^{(t)} & \cdots & h_{1M}^{(t)} \\ h_{21}^{(t)} & h_{22}^{(t)} & \cdots & h_{2M}^{(t)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ h_{N1}^{(t)} & h_{N2}^{(t)} & \cdots & h_{NM}^{(t)} \end{bmatrix}_{N \times M}$$



# Cognitive MIMO Radio



**Further improve  
the utilization of  
the spectrum**



# Cognitive MIMO Radio

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- **MIMO has been adopted in many wireless standards.**
- **Users and base stations may equipped with multiple antennas in future.**

**We consider cognitive MIMO radio**




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


# Spectrum Sharing Model



# Spectrum Sharing Model


- Cognitive MIMO MAC system model






# Spectrum Sharing Model

- Cognitive MIMO MAC system model




# Spectrum Sharing Model

- Cognitive MIMO INT system model



# Spectrum Sharing Model

- Cognitive MIMO INT system model



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# Game Theoretic Formulation

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## Why game theory?

## Game Theoretic approach

- Distributed
- Self-organized
- Discrete optimization
  - *convex optimization theory cannot be used*
- Feasible – some strategy profiles cannot satisfy the constraints
- Scalable – network is dynamic

The study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers



# Game Theoretic Formulation

- Cognitive MIMO MAC

$$\mathbf{y} = \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbf{H}_i \mathbf{F}_i \mathbf{x}_i + \mathbf{z} + \mathbf{v} = \sum_{i=1}^N \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i \mathbf{x}_i + \mathbf{z} + \mathbf{v}$$

Diagram illustrating the MIMO MAC model with labels and arrows:

- Receive signal vector** ( $\mathbf{y}$ )
- Channel matrix** ( $\mathbf{H}_i$ )
- Precoding matrix** ( $\mathbf{F}_i$ )
- Noise** ( $\mathbf{z}$ )
- Noise** ( $\mathbf{v}$ )
- Interference from PU** ( $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i$ )



# Game Theoretic Formulation

- Game formulation

Players  $\longleftrightarrow$  Rational secondary users currently in the system

Actions  $\longleftrightarrow$  Multimode precoding strategies

Payoff function: Indication function

$$u_i = R_i + \beta^P \Theta(\rho^{th} - B) + \beta^M \Theta(M_r - M_{total})$$

where  $R_i = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 \left| \frac{\rho_i}{L_i} \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^\dagger + \mathbf{N}_i \right| - \frac{1}{2} \log_2 |\mathbf{N}_i|$

$$\mathbf{N}_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\rho_j}{L_j} \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_j \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_j^\dagger + \mathbf{I} + \mathbf{V}$$



# Game Theoretic Formulation

- Game formulation

$\Theta(s)$  is defined as  $\Theta(s) = s$  for  $\check{s} < 0$  and  $\Theta(s) = 0$  otherwise,  $\beta^P$  and  $\beta^M$  are non-negative scalars, the second term in (6) is an indication of the interference temperature constraint, the third term in (6) is an indication of the maximum transmission number constraint.

$$\max_{\mathbf{F}_i \in \mathcal{F}_i} u_i(\mathbf{F}_i, \mathbf{F}_{-i}) \text{ for all } i \in \mathcal{N}$$





# Game Theoretic Formulation




Fig. 2. The average valid mutual information of different secondary users when SNR=10dB (1000 channel realizations) under Co.1 and Co.2.



# Game Theoretic Formulation

- Cognitive MIMO INT

$$y_i = \sum_{j=1}^n \mathbf{H}_{ji} \mathbf{F}_j \mathbf{x}_j + \mathbf{z}_i = \sum_{j=1}^n \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{ji} \mathbf{x}_j + \mathbf{z}_i$$

Energy efficiency of secondary user  $i$

$$\Gamma_i = \frac{R_i}{p_i} \left( \frac{\text{bits/Hz}}{\text{Joule}} \right)$$

Mutual information
power

$$u_i(\mathbf{a}_i, \mathbf{a}_{-i}) = \begin{cases} \Gamma_i + \beta^B \Theta(p^{th} - B) + \beta^R \Theta(R_i - R_i^{th}) - c_i p_i, & p_i > 0 \\ 0, & p_i = 0 \end{cases}$$

Indication function
Pricing

Interference temperature
Minimum transmission rate




# Game Theoretic Formulation

- Two assumption:

- A.1: If the Co.1 is not taken into account,  $\beta^B = 0$ . Otherwise,  $\beta^B$  is chosen to be sufficiently large to ensure that  $u_i < 0, \forall i \in \mathcal{N}$  when  $B > p^{th}$ .
- A.2: If the Co.2 is not taken into account,  $\beta^R = 0$ . Otherwise,  $\beta^R$  is assumed to be sufficiently large to guarantee that  $u_i < 0, \forall i \in \mathcal{N}$  when  $R_i > R_i^{th}$ .

$$\max_{\mathbf{a}_i \in \mathcal{A}_i} u_i(\mathbf{a}_i, \mathbf{a}_{-i}), \quad \text{for all } i \in \mathcal{N}.$$






equivalent

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\mathbf{a}_i \in \mathcal{A}_i} \Gamma_i, \quad \text{for all } i \in \mathcal{N} \\ & \text{s.t. } R_i \geq R_i^{th} \\ & \quad B \leq p^{th}. \end{aligned}$$






# Game Theoretic Formulation



The comparison of different algorithms (case 1)

Four users without constraints



The comparison of different algorithms (case 2)

Three users with constraints



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# Summary and Trends

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- Limited feedback spectrum sharing techniques can reach near optimal or required performance with relative low complexity, and is hence more practical.
- Game theoretic spectrum sharing algorithm can improve the performance compared to random selection algorithm and always find the feasible strategies with well designed payoff function.



# Summary and Trends

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- Multi-dimension/jointly radio resource management (channel allocation, power, bandwidth...)
- Cross-layer design
- Take economic factors into account (price, revenue...)



***Limited Feedback Spectrum Sharing for  
Cognitive MIMO Radio***

UC4G August 23, 2010 BUPT

**Thank you!**

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